Abstract. In this paper, we rst prove an explicit formula which bounds the degree of regularity of the family of HFEv (HFE with vinegar) and HFEv-(HFE with vinegar and minus) multivariate public key cryptosystems over a nite eld of size q. The degree of regularity of the polynomial system derived from an HFEv-system is less than or equal to (q − 1)(r + v + a − 1) 2 + 2 if q is even and r + a is odd,
the degree of regularity of the family of HFEv (HFE with vinegar) and HFEv-(HFE with vinegar and minus) multivariate public key cryptosystems over a nite eld of size q. The degree of regularity of the polynomial system derived from an HFEv-system is less than or equal to (q − 1)(r + v + a − 1) 2 + 2 if q is even and r + a is odd, (q − 1)(r + v + a) 2 + 2 otherwise, where the parameters v, D, q, and a are parameters of the cryptosystem denoting respectively the number of vinegar variables, the degree of the HFE polynomial, the base eld size, and the number of removed equations, and r is the rank paramter which in the general case is determined by D and q as r = log q (D − 1) + 1. In particular, setting a = 0 gives us the case of HFEv where the degree of regularity is bound by (q − 1)(r + v − 1) 2 + 2 if q is even and r is odd, (q − 1)(r + v) 2 + 2 otherwise.
This formula provides the rst solid theoretical estimate of the complexity of algebraic cryptanalysis of the HFEv-signature scheme, and as a corollary bounds on the complexity of a direct attack against the QUARTZ digital signature scheme. Based on some experimental evidence, we evaluate the complexity of solving QUARTZ directly using F4/F5 or similar Gröbner methods to be around 2 92 .
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Questions
HFE (Hidden Field Equations) and its derivatives form one of the best known families of multivariate quadratic public-key cryptosystems. It was invented by
Patarin as a modication of the Matsumoto-Imai cryptosystem C * in 1997.
Shor's algorithm from 1994 and its extensions [30, 34] will break RSA and ECC when large quantum computers became available. In this context, multivariate PKCs and in particular HFE [28] had been viewed as a possible candidate to replace RSA. Although it was shown by Faugère and Joux [19] that the basic form can be cryptanalyzed by a direct algebraic attack, simple HFE variations had already been designed to guard against known attacks. The best known of these is probably QUARTZ, a very conservatively designed HFE variant over F 2 using both the Vinegar and Minus modications [29] . QUARTZ (and all HFEv variants) have never been credibly cryptanalyzed.
We want to give a solid theoretical bound on the degree of regularity of HFEv and associated systems, such as QUARTZ, and thereby obtain a good estimate on the complexity of attacking HFEv, HFEv-, and ipHFE cryptosystems using Gröbner Bases.
Answers
One usually solves p 1 (
. . , x n ) = 0 over F q using Gröbner basis algorithms such as F 4 /F 5 . The critical parameter which determines the complexity is known as the degree of regularity, which is the maximum degree of monomials that appear in the computation. If we denote by (p i ) h the homogeneous leading part of p i , the degree of regularity of the system is the rst degree at which we nd non-trivial relations among the 
. . , λ n ) be the subspace of trivial relations generated by elements
Here e i means the i-th unit vector consisting of all zeros except one 1 at the i-th position. The degree of regularity of a homogeneous quadratic set is then
We nd an upper bound to D reg for HFEv and HFEv-, which like in earlier studies depends on the size of the base eld q, the rank of the HFE polynomial r, the number of removed equations a (if minus is used), and additionally the number of vinegar variables v, but in general on not the number of variables n:
, if q is even and r + a is odd,
For small numbers we evaluated D reg of random tests for HFEv and HFEvusing MAGMA and in each case the bound is relatively tight (see Section 4.1)
which lends credence to predictions using our bound above for the Gröbner bases complexity.
As an example, substituting the actual parameters of QUARTZ we get D reg ≤ 9. Assuming that it is indeed 9, we can compute the number of bit-operations required to break it as ≈ 2 92 (see Section 4.1), so QUARTZ should be reasonably secure for now.
This also shows that the break of an instance of internally perturbed HFE in [18] , which is very much related to HFEv, is likely a case of overly aggressive parameters rather than of systematic problems.
Related Work
The C * cryptosystem can be seen as a simple case of an HFE cryptosystem, and [14] noted that Patarin's linearization attack [27] was equivalent to the degree of regularity of C * being three (in line with the formula in that paper).
The Square cryptosystem [7] is a C * system with rank 1 and an odd base eld. [14] proves a lower bound on its degree of regularity, showing a direct algebraic attack with Gröbner basis to be infeasible. However, such a result does not mean that the system is secure, because Square is actually broken by a dierent attack. [9] was the rst to claim to break HFE (cryptanalyze in signicantly under design security), and [10] the earliest to mention HFEv-and HFE-specically.
But neither was followed up with a concrete implementation, and all interest was attracted to the news of Faugère's actually breaking HFE Challenge 1 [19] .
[21] started to investigate algebraically the degree of regularity of HFE, but [17] seems to be the rst rigorous study of the subject, which is continued by [14, 15] .
Background
In the standard formulation of a multivariate public-key cryptosystem over a nite eld F, the public-key P : 
Any function or map F from K to K can be expressed uniquely as a polynomial function with coecients in K and degree less than q n , namely
Denote by deg K (F ) the degree of F (X) for any map F . Using φ, we can build a new map F :
which is essentially F but viewed from the perspective of F n . We can identify F and F unless there is a chance of confusion. An F-degree-2 or F-quadratic function from K to K can in this framework be seen to be a polynomial all of whose monomials have exponent q i + q j or q i or 0 for some i and j. The general form of this F-quadratic function is
, the extended Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial map. Such a Q(X) with a xed low K-degree is used to build the HFE multivariate public key cryptosystems, as in the following
Note that the coecients are values in K, and all coecients a ii = 0 if q = 2, since those are covered by the b-part of the coecients.
For a recent overview of multivariate cryptosystems, including all the common modiers such as minus, internal perturbation, and vinegar see [16] . It gives this formulation of HFEv, which uses the vinegar modication [23] , built from this polynomial:
where the auxiliary variableX occupies only a subspace of small rank v in K ∼ = F n . The function Q is quadratic in the components of X andX , and so is P = T • Q • S for ane bijections T and S in F n and F n+v . We hope that P is hard to invert to the adversary, while the legitimate user, with the knowledge of (S, T ) can compute X by substituting a randomX , then solving for X via rootnding algorithms such as Berlekamp (or Cantor-Zassenhaus, if q = 2). To limit the eort of Berlekamp, we restrict the maximum degree D of the polynomial. QUARTZ has the parameter set (q, n, D, v, a) = (2, 103, 129, 4, 3).
We note that to verify in QUARTZ, one invokes the public map multiple times, but the ability to defeat QUARTZ still principally rests on inverting an
HFEv-public map.
In an HFEv-cryptosystem, the public key P becomes P − , that is, it is released minus the last a equations. Again we hope that inverting P − is intractible without the trapdoor. The legitimate user can invert P − simply by appending a random numbers from F q to to the ciphertext or signature before inverting P .
Another closely related scheme to HFEv is ipHFE (internally perturbed HFE). Suppose in Eq. 1,X is not a free variable, but is instead the image of , a map from F n onto F v . So the central map is really Q (X) := Q(X, (X)). To invert Q , the legitimate user would guess the values at positions in V = (X), solve for X, and then check whether V = (X). So the inversion process becomes less ecient in the sense that it takes in the worst case q v tries to get one answer. From this description, we can see that ipHFE is the same as HFEv with the prex modication (i.e., one or more limbs of the plaintext in a multivariate scheme becomes pre-determined).
Conventional Wisdom about HFE Security
There is no proof of security for any variant of HFE or any of the usual multivariate PKC proposals that reduce to a dicult computational problem commonly used for cryptography. However, similarly the security of NTRU depends on the hardness of lattice problems, but does not reduce to them. There are lattice-based systems which reduce to hard lattice problems, but these are much less ecient than NTRU. Analogously, there are multivariate PKCs that are provably secure in the sense that a break of such a PKC would imply an advance in the solution to an MQ-related computational problem [22, 32, 33] , which happen to be much less ecient. Hence we take the approach that only careful study of cryptanalytic techniques can determine the security of a cryptosystem.
It is unfortunate, then, that HFE Challenge 1 was proposed when we understood the algebra behind it much less. It is even more unfortunate that some of the proposed HFE variants were overly aggressive and were promptly broken [3, 4, 18] just like many other multivariate schemes, because the public perception became biased against the HFE family.
HFE variants also gained a further reputation for being imsy, more specifically poly-time-solvable [17, 21] with further mathematical studies. In particular [21] sketched a way to bound the degree of regularity for HFE when q = 2, using an approach to lift the problem back to the extension K, an idea rst suggested by . They managed to describe a connection of the degree of regularity of the HFE system to the degree of regularity of a lifted system over the big eld. Heuristic asymptotic bounds were found when q = 2 leading to the conclusion that if D = O(n) the complexity of Gröbner basis solvers for the corresponding HFE systems is quasi-polynomial.
In some ways, this reputation is actually somewhat unfair, since simple HFE variations such as QUARTZ have resisted known attacks for a long time, and it is actually known in various contexts how the degree of operations in an algebraic attack varies (cf. [14] ). We hope to achieve a more realistic evaluation of the security of HFE-related schemes. In particular we hope that better understanding of the degree of regularity under algebraic attcks can establish some HFE variants as fundamentally sound cryptosystems which had previously been proposed with overly aggressive parameters, rather than fundamentally broken systems (like C * −).
Algebraic Cryptanalysis
Aside from cases in which brute-force enumeration [5] seems to the best practical way to solve systems, almost all of today's algebraic algorithms to solve
over F q go back to Buchberger's algorithm for computing Gröbner bases [6] .
Lazard proposed the following critical simplication (later reinvented as the XL Method): multiply the equations with monomials to form a collection of relations up to a some degree d. Linearize (i.e., treat each individual monomial as a variable), and use well-studied matrix algorithms over F q on the resulting matrix (the extended Macaulay matrix ) [11, 25] .
The Degree of Regularity The critical concept in the complexity analysis of algebraic polynomial solving algorithms is the concept of degree of regularity.
As given in Denition 1.1, the degree of regularity of the polynomial system is the lowest degree where we nd a non-trivial degree drop. Conventional wisdom has it that in general this is the degree at which F 4 /F 5 and similar algorithms usually terminate. Therefore D reg is used to characterize the complexity of the algorithms.
We rst note that almost all modern Gröbner Bases methods improve on XL as follows: suppose we x a degree d and multiply each p i with all monomials of degree d − deg p i to create a large collection of relations of degree d.
Order the monomials and linearize these equations to obtain the Macaulay ma- After we nd such polynomials with degree drop, we multiply them by individual variables, and we obtain equations of at most degree d, which are effectively elimination remnants from higher-degree relations. If necessary, we can repeat this process many times until we can solve for all the variables. This describes MutantXL or XL2 [13, 36] which will terminate at the same degree as
. Any superiority of the latter comes from having fewer redundant equations being generated or going through the elimination.
In Denition 1.1, we can see that the subspace T d of trivial syzygies represents a known-to-be-useless degree drop in the following sense:
h represent the homogeneous highest degree part of the polynomial p, and (p) a corresponding row in a Macaulay-type matrix.
which is equivalent to the combination of degree-4 rows
k (x k x p i ) being of degree-3 (or fewer). Equally clearly this degreedrop will not give us anything useful since
given that both give (p i p j ). Thus we just found a linear combination of polynomials we already have at degree 3. So a trivial or principal syzygy between the top-degree parts (p i ) h leads to a trivial degree drop useless for generating new equations. We must verify that a degree-drop is non-trivial before we can claim that we have reached the degree of regularity.
Issue of Terminology There is some confusion about the term the degree of regularity. The rank of Macaulay matrices at a given degree can be derived as the coecients of certain generating functions, with the heuristic assumption that there are no non-trivial syzygies. A system where this holds for all degrees is called regular. However this can be the case only for underdetermined systems over characteristic zero elds. Otherwise at a suciently high degree the generating function eventually has a non-positive coecient, and regularity becomes impossible. Systems for which the rank of the Macaulay matrices follows the heuristic for as long as possible are called semi-regular [12] . Denition 1.1
follows [17] in that the degree of regularity is dened as the rst appearance of non-trivial degree fall, i.e., where the system ceases to behave as semi-regular.
The heuristic formulas that have since long been known to hold for the degree of regularity of most random systems (including asymptotics) are given by Bardet et al [1, 2, 37] . However, this formula does not hold for most systems with structure.
Conventional wisdom also accepts that when m/n = h + o(1) where h is a constant not far removed from 1, solving m generic or random equations in n variables is exponential in time and space in n. We can do a tiny bit better. That is, for suciently large h we may solve the system faster than just guessing variables rst (cf. e.g. [8, 35] ), but it is still exponential time and space in m (and/or n).
Invariance of degree of regularity The degree of regularity is invariant under invertible linear transformation in both the domain and the codomain.
So if P = T • Q • S is the public map of a multivariate PKC with the central map Q with both S and T invertible ane transformations, then the degree of regularity in solving X from P (X) = Y depends only on Q, and can be written D reg (Q).
Main Results
To recap, suppose we wish to solve an HFEv system with K ∼ = F n , where F = F q , with degree D and v vinegar variables. We would have then n + v variables and n equations. However, MutantXL or F 4 /F 5 algorithms deal with determined or overdetermined equations. The standard way to get around this problem is to guess some v variables and bring it down to a system with n variables. As noted earlier, we have now an ipHFE instance. We try to analyze the direct attack as in [14, 15, 17] . First, let us present our main results.
Theorem 3.1 Let r be the rank of the HFE polynomial and v the number of vinegar variables. We may bound the degree of regularity of HFEv as follows:
This result is sucient to bound the complexity of a direct algebraic attack against HFEv. If we assume that the direct algebraic attack is the best attack on HFEv systems, this would be the most important bound required to evaluate the security of odd-eld HFEv and derivatives.
However, QUARTZ is an instance of HFEv-, not just HFEv. We recall that HFEv-, of which QUARTZ is a special case is derived from HFEv by removing a few public key polynomials. We normally have n+v variables and n−a equations. To solve a HFEv-case, we again rst guess v-values. Then we have n variables and n − a equations. As we mentioned, this is essentially an ipHFE system. Now we need to bound the degree of regularity of a direct algebraic attack on HFEv on such a system. Theorem 3.2 Let r be the rank of the HFE polynomial, v the number of vinegar variables, and a the number of minus equations, then we may bound the degree of regularity as follows:
We will now show how our main results is proved.
To prove Equation (3) 
We now need to show that the rank of an HFEv central polynomial with v vinegar variables is no higher than that of the original HFE polynomial plus v.
First, we rewrite the HFEv polynomial so that it is more easily handled.
Proposition 3.4 The associated polynomial when solving an HFEv or an ipHFE system over the big eld K can be written as:
whereX i := Tr(α i X) for suitably chosen α i . The map Tr is the trace function, which is also given by Tr(X) :=
Proof. We note that Tr is a nontrivial linear map of F n → F. For some representation of F n ∼ = K, we can write it as a projection into the rst component. With a suitably chosen α i , we can make the rst component of α i X any nontrivial linear map of the components of X. So we can express each of the components ofX = (X) in Eq. 1 as Tr(α i X) for some α i .
So Theorem 3.1 can be proved if we can show that:
Proposition 3.5 The rank of the quadratic form associated with the polynomial P above, written R(P ), is bounded by:
To obtain this we need this result about quadratic forms: Proposition 3.6 [26, Chapter 6 ] The rank of a quadratic form F is less than or equal to the minimum number of linear forms one needs to express F as a quadratic function in them. That is, if one can write F as a quadratic function of linear forms 1 , . . . , r , then Rank F ≤ r.
Denition 3.7 Let F be a quadratic form over a eld k, and F (X, Y ) := X t F Y be the bilinear (symmetric) form associated with F over the eld k n . Let
N F as linear subspace is called the radical for the bilinear form F .
Note that for any F of rank r, we can write F in the linear forms 1 , . . . , r , and any X with 1 (X) = · · · = r (X) = 0 is in N F . So by using the following observation, we see that the dimension of N F is n − r. 
Proposition 3.9 Under the conditions and notation of Denition 3.7 and Propo-
The last proposition follows from 3.7 and 3.8, basically by inclusion-exclusion.
Proposition 3.10 Let F (x 0 , ..x n−1 ) be a quadratic form (or polynomial) whose rank is r. Here each variable x i can additionally be considered as a linear map or function from F n to F. In this manner it would be viewed the i-th component map x i (u 0 , . . . , u n−1 ) = u i , for (u 0 , . . . , u n−1 ) ∈ F n . Let A : F n → F n be an invertible linear transformation (with A −1 its inverse), such that
where each z is a linear function from F n to F, i.e., z : (x 0 , . . . ,
This follows from Proposition 3.9.
Now we further note that the process of xing v variables to get a determined system corresponds to introducing v linear relations of the form
From this we can substitute for each of the X j , a linear combination of the X q i (which is itself linear in X), which shows that the quadratic form P of HFEv or ipHFE can be expressed using v extra linear forms than the Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial map P (that is, without the v forms X i ). Then since the rank of a quadratic form is bounded by the number of linear forms used to express it, we have Proposition 3.5, and Equation (3) then follows.
We note that the above line of reasoning is good only for odd q because in binary elds the rank of the associated matrix to a symmetric form is always even, creating various o-by-one errors in the above process, we may go through steps akin to that in [14] to patch those o-by-one problems (to be included in a full journal version), and account for the binary eld cases in Theorem 3.1.
A note on HFE over tower elds. An HFE-derivative cryptosystem built over F q k is also one over F q . So we can (for example) attack an HFE-type instance built over F 16 by solve it as a system over F 2 . However, in this situation the rank parameter r would usually be log 16 (D − 1) + 1, not log 2 (D − 1) + 1.
The reason is that the central Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial, and therefore the rank r, is an entity in the big eld and does not vary according to our viewpoint.
Proving Theorem 3.2 Again let us examine only odd characteristic cases for now. Put another way, letP − be the public key of an HFEv-instance which is derived from the corresponding public key of an HFEv instance: 
Tests and Results
We ran MAGMA-2.7.12 on random systems for each parameter n ≤ 13, r ≤ 4, a, v ≤ 2, and q ≤ 5, on a workstation (with 2x Opteron 6212 and 32GB of RAM) to nd D reg on 420 randomly generated HFEv and HFEv-systems, and for q = 2 further for 1 random system each up to n = 29. We added x q i − x i for each i as part of the system of equations, so as to trigger eld-specic optimizations that MAGMA might have for q = 2. In each case, D reg proves to be the smaller of either the minimum of the bound in the formula above or, if we use [u]S to mean the coecient of the term u in a corresponding series expansion of S: The numbers may seem too small to be conclusive, but for 13 variables and equations over F 7 or 14 variables and equations over F 5 MAGMA is already running out of memory, and these results lend credence to predictions using our bound for the Gröbner Bases complexity for HFEv and HFEv-systems. We can now try to justify the predictions for QUARTZ given in Section 1.
Implications for QUARTZ
We have obtained a bound on the degree of regularity of 9 for QUARTZ (which has q = 2, n = 103, r = 7, a = 3, v = 4), which represents a big drop already compared to degree 13 for a random system of that size (cf. formula above).
However, if the bound is reasonably tight, the number of columns (monomials) involved in the elimination should be roughly the number of top-level monomials, which are T := Note: This evaluation above is highly optimistic in that it makes the implicit assumption that there is no penalty for accessing large memory. This may be very wrong in two ways:
There is a very perceptible cost penalty in assembling a large amount of RAM which is either accessible on one machine or is networked using high speed interconnect to every other machine.
Accessing a large amount of memory is slower; most server motherboards takes a speed penalty when using the maximum number of memory modules, and accessing memory on other machines of course incurs terrible latency.
What this might mean practically is that it might be more advantageous to attack QUARTZ by brute-force [5] , which imposes no communication requirements (i.e., networking and memory bandwidth and latencies) and is embarassingly parallelizable (hence perfectly scalable).
Final Remark: In some of the cases previously studied, we can prove tightness of the bounds. Clearly more of this type of work is needed, where theoretical bounds for attacks are given, just like the studies of theoretical bounds on differential probabilities in AES.
